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Hemp Production Network Effects: Are Producers Tipped Toward 
Suboptimal Varietal Selection by Their Neighbors?
Tanner McCarty (Utah State University) and Jeffrey Young (Murray State University)
INTRODUCTION
The 2018 farm bill removed industrial hemp 
(Cannabis sativa L.) from the Schedule 1 Con-
trolled Substance List and reclassified it as an 
agricultural commodity. This federal legalization 
sparked public and private interest in hemp’s 
potential to augment farmers’ incomes and drive 
rural development in a time of low commodity 
prices and restricted market access for agricul-
tural producers (Kentucky Department of Agricul-
ture, 2018; Place, 2019a, 2019b). Expected hemp 
returns vary significantly based on the chosen cul-
tivar. Floral hemp leads to the highest expected 
return, as opposed to seed or fiber. Flower culti-
vars contain high concentrations of cannabidiol 
(CBD), which is extracted postharvest from the 
flower. Budgets for CBD production estimate one 
ton of dried flower, with a 10% CBD concentra-
tion, is worth between $10,000 to $70,000 (Cui 
& Smith, 2019; Mark & Shepherd, 2019; Place, 
2019a, 2019b). These prices are the result of the 
high CBD concentrations, achieved only from 
feminized unpollinated hemp crop. CBD is a high- 
value, nonintoxicating cannabis compound used 
in a host of therapeutic and beauty products. The 
CBD market is one of the fastest- growing markets 
in the United States. In 2018, the market value of 
CBD- containing products was estimated between 
$0.6 and $2 billion, and it is expected to grow to 
$15 billion by 2025 (Azer et al., 2019). 
A field of feminized CBD hemp plants can be 
inadvertently pollinated from fiber hemp, grain 
hemp, nonfeminized CBD hemp, or even mari-
juana (Bourque, 2019; DeDecker, 2019). Before 
the 2018 farm bill, farmers who grew CBD hemp 
were unaffected by cross- pollination since they 
had no neighbors cultivating non- CBD hemp (e.g., 
fiber or seed). Hemp fields, regardless of the type 
of hemp grown, were geographically removed 
from the next; only research plots were legal. Since 
then, the number of industrial hemp producers 
has significantly increased. Hemp CBD growers 
claim cross- pollination from neighbors growing 
cultivars for fiber or seed production destroys the 
value of their flower crop. A field experiment by 
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Meier and Mediavilla (1998) found pollination 
to reduce CBD concentration levels by more than 
50%. As growers continue to enter the hemp mar-
ket, a CBD grower gains neighbors growing non- 
CBD hemp. As this concentration of non- CBD 
hemp  growers increases, the likelihood of cross- 
pollination approaches certainty.
 In markets where positive/negative externali-
ties are incurred through social networks, existing 
equilibriums can be unstable and tip to a dramat-
ically new state once a specific externality thresh-
old is passed (Gladwell, 2006; Jackson & Yariv, 
2006, 2007). For instance, if each CBD grower 
best responds given the conditions of the previous 
period, when the cross- pollination risk crosses a 
threshold, they will switch to growing non- CBD 
hemp. This, in turn affects their neighbors grow-
ing CBD, which will then influence those neigh-
bors’ production decision to switch from CBD to 
non- CBD alternatives. Eventually, a large propor-
tion of the population could be exposed to a large 
negative- network externality, which would force 
all/most producers to grow non- CBD hemp. With-
out the externality, most growers would choose to 
grow the more profitable alternative, CBD. This 
means additional hemp licensing could lead to a 
suboptimal Nash equilibrium where higher valued 
CBD crops would no longer be viable due to the 
increased risk of cross- pollination from non- CBD 
crops. 
The problem is, no one knows under what con-
ditions the industrial hemp market would tip to 
reduced CBD production, and what the severity 
of the tip would be. The failure to prevent this tip 
could result in the loss and/or reduced viability 
of a multibillion- dollar agricultural industry. On 
the other hand, introducing unneeded legislation 
could raise the cost of hemp production. This 
paper offers two primary contributions to address-
ing this problem. First, we identify the marginal 
impact that hemp market primitives (pollen trans-
mission rate, economic attractiveness of either 
crop and network structure) has in pushing the 
industrial hemp market toward a tip to the sub-
optimal, reduced- CBD Nash equilibrium. Second, 
we identify policies capable of targeting the hemp 
market primitives that have the largest impact on 
tipping the industry. Using the general framework 
developed by Jackson and Yariv (2006), we exam-
ine hemp varietal selection through the lens of 
negative network externalities and decision mak-
ing within social networks. 
Hemp markets are complex. The number of 
each grower’s neighbors, their decisions, and 
the transmission rate of pollen from neighbor-
ing fields affects each grower’s payoff. The social 
network economics literature examines how 
an individual agent’s payoff is affected by their 
neighbor’s actions. A subset of the social network 
literature, first explored by Gladwell (2006), 
examines how the change of actions by a small 
subgroup can disproportionately affect the rest of 
the population’s outcomes. The proposition that a 
change in the actions of several agents can have a 
dramatic effect on the final equilibrium of actions 
followed by an entire population is referred to as 
tipping. The key takeaway in the tipping litera-
ture is that a change in action by a sufficiently 
high proportion of the population can result in 
a cascading response, where the rest of the pop-
ulation responds by changing their own actions. 
Thus, this social network literature is especially 
applicable to industrial hemp.
Jackson and Yariv (2006) developed a generalized 
model capable of accommodating these network 
externalities, tipping, and agents’ best response to 
neighbor’s actions. They use this model to exam-
ine how changes in key primitives relative to social 
networks affect the threshold at which tipping to 
a new action occurs and how much of the pop-
ulation subsequently adopts the new action after 
a tip. We apply their general model to a grower’s 
decision to grow CBD or non- CBD hemp. Specifi-
cally, we characterize how economic and network 
factors affect hemp growers’ expected returns for 
CBD and non- CBD. We then test under what con-
ditions these hemp markets tip to new equilibriums 
of decreased CBD production. We subsequently 
identify the most important  influencers of tips and 
discuss policy tools to shape them. 
MODEL
Assume that a finite set of hemp growers can choose 
one of two actions: action A, grow CBD hemp, or 
action B, grow non- CBD hemp. The action each 
grower chooses affects the payout function of his/
her neighbors through the network. Each indi-
vidual grower i has a number of direct neighbors 
of a degree di. The percentage of individuals within 
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this subset that have d neighbors is represented as 
( )P d 0≥ , for , , , ,d dmax1 2 …=  and ( )P d 1maxd
d
1 ==/ , 
where P(d) represents the percentage of the popu-
lation with d neighbors.
First consider action A, the default choice due 
to its higher expected profit. The payout grower i 
receives from growing crop A is a function of the 
expected revenue, riA, minus operating cost from 
choosing A, wiA, minus the expected externality 
cost incurred through cross- pollination, eiAg(di)mi 
(where eiA is the penalty to revenue due to reduced 
CBD concentrations if cross- pollination occurs). 
The term g(di)mi denotes the probability of cross- 
pollination. Cross- pollination becomes increas-
ingly likely as the fraction of grower i’s neighbors 
choosing to grow B, mi, increases. The number 
of neighbors that farmer i has, di, also increases 
the probability of cross- pollination. Thus both mi 
and di affect how likely grower i is to experienc-
ing externality cost eiA if they choose A. Finally, a 
grower evaluates these expected prices, costs, and 
externalities through their own risk aversion char-
acteristics leading to their own utility of crop A, 
UiA. Grower i’s payoff for choosing to grow crop 
A, ViA, takes the form:
 ( ( ) )V U r w e g d   iA iA iA iA iA i im= − −  (1)
The payoff to grower i for cultivating B is indepen-
dent of what their neighbors choose, since action 
B is unaffected by pollination. Grower i’s payoff 
for choosing B depends only on B’s revenue, riB, 
the operating cost, wiB, and how their risk aversion 
shape their utility, UiB. Grower i’s payoff for action 
B, ViB is defined as:
 ( )V U wr iB iB iB iB= −  (2)
A grower will switch from action A to B once he 
perceived benefits of B, BiB outweigh the costs of 
B, CiB. We rearrange terms to make the costs of 
choosing B equal to the value grower i places on 
the forgone private profit from choosing A, riA 
minus the private profit of choosing B, riB:
 ( )C U wiB iB iBr= −  (3)
This means the benefit of choosing B is the expected 
value of the externality cost that would have been 
incurred had the grower chosen A. Rearranging 
these terms allows us to isolate the effect of the 
externality size and probability on individual deci-
sion making.
 ( )( )B U e g d  iB iA i im=  (4)
Finally, a grower currently producing CBD hemp 
will switch to non- CBD hemp once their benefits 






Equation (5) effectively captures a grower’s deci-
sion to continue growing CBD or switch to non- 
CBD. Changes in prices, costs, or the structure of g 
will push individual CBD growers toward or away 
from non- CBD production, which in turn affects 
their neighbors through the network externality 
they experience. Due to the network’s intercon-
nectedness, changes by individuals in the network 
may dramatically shift the portfolio of hemp pro-
duction from CBD to non- CBD alternatives. 
Game Setup
At time t = 0, a percentage of the growers within 
the population of all hemp growers randomly 
select B, X0. At each time point, t > 0 each grower 
responds to the distribution of other growers who 
chose B in period t -­ 1. We assume that growers 
who voluntarily chose B never switch back; this 
ensures a stable “steady state” equilibrium result 
over time. This assumption greatly simplifies the 
problem with little loss in generality. If a grower 
decides to switch to B to avoid a negative external-
ity for relatively low levels of di and mi, they would 
not switch back at later periods when these levels 
are higher. Depending on market characteristics 
and the initial size of X0, the state variable Xt (per-
centage of growers within the network who have 
adopted B at time t) will either rise or fall over 
time until it reaches a steady state, X. Once in the 
steady state, no agent has any incentive to switch 
states. The initial state X0 enters into (5) through 
its implicit effect on mi; more initial adopters of B 
within the population (X0) means that individual 
farmers will, on average, have a higher value of mi.
One of three possibilities results from the ini-
tial value of X0. First, low levels of X0 cause a 
decrease in the percentage of B adopters over time 
(Xt + 1 < Xt), and the percentage of B adopters falls 
until the steady state adopter percentage, X X< 0. 
Second, high levels of X0 trigger a tip (Xt + 1 > Xt), 
and the percentage of B adopters rapidly increases 
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until a new equilibrium occurs where X X> 0. Third, 
the current percentage of B adopters is maintained 
over time (Xt + 1 = Xt), and X X0= . This point is of 
particular importance as it triggers the tip to a new 
steady state. This level of X0 that maintains balance 
is referred to as the tipping point. Values above 
cause an increase to a new higher steady state and 
values below drive decreased B adoption. This tip-
ping point is denoted X*0. In the context of hemp 
production, passing the tipping point is problematic 
since the tip results from the negative externality 
costs that non- CBD producers impose on CBD pro-
ducers. The result is a suboptimal Nash equilibrium. 
PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS  
AND NETWORK STRUCTURE 
The following subsections explain the empirics 
associated with Equation (5) and the structure of 
the network through which those individual deci-
sions permeate. 
Costs of Switching to Non- CBD Hemp
As previously mentioned, the costs of switching to 
non- CBD hemp production is the utility grower i 
receives from private profit of growing CBD minus 
the private profit to growing non- CBD. CBD hemp 
farming is an enterprise of relatively high risk 
and potential returns, when compared with fiber 
or grain hemp production (Hanchar, 2019). For 
example, fiber hemp revenues are estimated to be 
$750–$800 per acre, which appears rather small 
when compared to the expected $10,000–$70,000 
per acre for CBD production (Hanchar, 2019; Mark 
& Shepherd, 2019). The range of CBD revenue is so 
large due to differences in CBD prices, CBD con-
centration levels within the plant, and yield per acre 
experienced in different locations at different times. 
Fiber hemp operating cost is estimated to be 
$390 per acre. The selling price of feminized clones 
necessary for achieving high CBD concentration 
range between $4 and $10 per individual plant, 
with more than a thousand planted on a single 
acre (Kim & Mahlberg, 1997; Meier & Media-
villa, 1998; Small & Naraine, 2016). Combined 
with high labor requirements, these costs con-
tribute to an estimated yearly operating cost of 
around $10,000–$15,000 per acre (Hanchar, 
2019; Place, 2019a, 2019b; Schaneman, 2019). 
CBD hemp is risky to grow; various stresses such 
as drought, temperature, and altitude can cause 
THC levels within a plant to spike (Gerlach, 
2019; Place, 2019a, 2019b). If a CBD crop tests at 
more than 0.3% THC content, it is destroyed by 
drug enforcement agencies (Gerlach, 2019; Place, 
2019a, 2019b). These differences in risk- return 
profiles imply that more risk- averse hemp grow-
ers will gravitate toward producing grain or fiber, 
while the less risk- averse hemp growers will grav-
itate toward the more profitable CBD production. 
The exact level of CiB varies by grower.
Benefits of Switching to Non- CBD
As mentioned in the previous section, the benefit of 
switching to non- CBD is the utility gained from the 
avoided damage from cross- pollination achieved 
by not growing CBD, U(eiAg(di)mi). Parameter eiA 
denotes the damage itself and g(di)mi denotes the 
probability of cross- pollination. Parameter g maps 
the effect of di onto the expectation of externality 
damage. We specify ( )g d di ia=
b where b approx-
imates how contagious an additional neighbor 
growing fiber is for cross- pollination (the marginal 
transmission rate). For this analysis we assume 
≤ ≤0 1b . This means that increases in both the total 
number of grower i’s neighbors and the fraction 
of neighbors within a given grower i’s network 
choosing B increase the relative attractiveness of 
choosing non- CBD for grower i. This assumption 
captures the empirical effect cross- pollination has 
on CBD producers. The specification of b also 
ensures that there is a diminishing effect of each 
additional neighbor on the probability of cross- 
pollination. We use a as a scalar to constrain the 
probability of cross- pollination between 0 and 
100%. Specifically, we rescaled a to ensure 100% 
of cross- pollination when m0 = 1 and 0% when 
m0 = 0, for the highest level of d considered in 
this analysis, dmax = 20. The exact level of BiB is 
affected by current CBD prices, CBD crop yields, 
the reduction in CBD concentration levels incurred 
through cross- pollination, and grower’s valuation 
of risk. This means BiB varies by grower.
Cost- Benefit Ratios 
Differences in benefits and costs across  growers 
means there is a distribution of possible cost- benefit 
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ratios of adopting non- CBD, RC
B
iB
iB =  within a social 
network. We follow Jackson and Yariv (2006) by 
modeling this distribution of R to be uniformly 
distributed on the interval 0 to Rmax. We explore 
Rmax levels on uniform distributions between 0 to 
Rmax = 10 and uniform distributions between 0 
and Rmax = 40.
Structure of the Underlying Network
We follow the assumptions made by Jackson and 
Yariv (2006) and assume that growers interact with 
one another through a network with a “scale- free 
structure,” specifically the pdf of having d neigh-
bors, ( )f d d
1
.2 5= . This distributional assumption for 
neighbor degree is an appropriate characterization 
of the industrial hemp networks. A few areas of 
the United States have many individuals growing 
hemp in a small area. Many areas of the United 
States have a limited number of individuals grow-
ing hemp in a large area. Furthermore, this mod-
eling assumption is consistent with many other 
social network applications such as the World 
Wide Web and epidemiology. Powers associated 
with these types of distributions often provide the 
best approximation of the network when they fall 
between 2 and 3 (Newman, 2002).
The average degree of neighbors within the 







. The percentage of B 
adopters in a network at time t evolves following 
the formula in Equation 61:
 
( ) ,X d
dP d










Due to the heterogeneity in a grower’s perceived 
costs and benefits to switching to non- CBD and 
the heterogeneity in the number of neighbors a 
grower has, the exact threshold for individual con-
version to choose non- CBD varies by farmer. From 
a policy perspective, the individual decision is less 
important than the market as a whole. However, 
to understand the market we must first understand 
what drives individual decisions. In this section, 
we focus results on qualitative considerations that 
affect all individual growers’ decisions to switch 
to non- CBD. In the following section, we quanti-
tatively examine the impact of changes in key mar-
ket primitives on the market. 
Recall that Equation (5) maps the individual 
decision of a hemp grower to continue grow-
ing CBD or switch to non- CBD conditional on 
actions by grower i’s neighbors. The actions taken 
by grower i this period subsequently affect the 
actions of their neighbors next period through 
their network. Taking the first order conditions of 
each variable in Equation (5), we recover the effect 
that each variable has on a grower’s decision to 
grow CBD or non- CBD hemp. The results of these 
comparative statics are included in Table 1.
The results suggest that increases to private profit 
associated with growing CBD, riA, make a change 
to non- CBD less attractive, whereas increases in 
private profit to non- CBD make it more attractive. 
Put differently, if non- CBD production increases 
expected profitability relative to CBD production, 
more growers will switch to non- CBD. This out-
come is expected. The larger the size of the net-
work externality, ei, the more attractive non- CBD 
becomes. In other words, the grower would have 
more incentive to switch to non- CBD production 
if cross- pollination penalized CBD levels by 60% 
than if it penalized CBD levels by 30%. This result 
reinforces the importance of genetics in selecting 
CBD cultivars. Some strains of CBD plants may be 
less affected by cross- pollination than others.
A grower producing CBD will be incentivized 
to switch to non- CBD as the percentage of their 
neighbors growing non- CBD hemp, mi increases. 
As the percentage of neighbors growing non- CBD 
increases, a grower will become increasingly likely 
to get their CBD crop cross- pollinated as they are 
effectively surrounded on more sides by neighbors 
Table 1. Change in grower i’s benefit cost ratio, R, 
of switching from CBD to non- CBD production 
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who could cross- pollinate them. The total number 
of neighbors, di, matters as well. Even if a grower is 
surrounded by the same acreage of neighbors grow-
ing non- CBD, cross- pollination is more likely if 
they have multiple small neighbors growing it than 
if one large neighbor is; pollination can only occur 
over a specific time interval. If a CBD grower plants 
at a sufficiently different time than their neighbor 
growing non- CBD hemp, then cross- pollination is 
less likely. The probability that at least one neighbor 
plants non- CBD at a problematic time increases as 
more neighbors are introduced (the supply of avail-
able land is assumed to be fixed).
Finally, the strength of g affects farmers’ deci-
sions to grow non- CBD. Put differently, g effectively 
amplifies the effect that having more neighbors 
and having a higher percentage of neighbors has 
on the probability of being cross- pollinated. If g 
becomes stronger from something like the aver-
age distance between neighbors decreasing, then 
growers will be increasingly incentivized to switch 
to non- CBD production. 
Market Dynamics
In this section, we examine tipping thresholds 
and the resulting steady state under a range of 
key market primitives. These primitives include b 
values between 0 and 1, maximum degrees within 
a scale- free network, dmax, between 5 and 20, and 
the uniform distribution modeling benefit- cost 
ratios occurring between 0 and 10, and 0 and 
40. Changing each of these primitives affects the 
percentage of initial adopters that cause a tip to 
increased non- CBD hemp production and the 
level of non- CBD hemp production that occurs 
after the tip. The following sections explain what 
each comparative static captures, why it was con-
ducted, and the impact that changing it has on 
tipping points and the resulting steady state.
Transmission of Pollen 
Recall that g d 0a m=
b  denotes the probability that 
cross- pollination occurs. We rescaled a to ensure 
100% of cross- pollination when X0 = 1.0 for 
the highest level of d considered in this analy-
sis, dmax = 20, and conditional on what b is, 
20
1a= b . Specifying the problem in this way allows 
us to approximate how contagious an additional 
neighbor growing fiber is for cross- pollination 
(marginal transmission rate). The marginal trans-
mission rate denotes how quickly one more neigh-
bor increases the probability of cross- pollination. 
Exploring various transmission rates matters 
because there is currently only limited evidence on 
transmission rates for cross- pollination between 
fields. If pollen is highly transmittable and pol-
linates the majority of a neighbor’s field, then a 
b closer to 0 is appropriate. If, however, pollen 
is less transmittable and/or only pollinates small 
pockets of a neighbor’s field, then a b closer to 
1.0 is appropriate. Values of b should not exceed 
1.0, for this would imply an increasing marginal 
pollen transmission rate. Under baseline assump-
tions and 50% of the population having adopted 
fiber (X0 = 0.50), going from zero to one neighbors 
changes the probability of cross- pollination from 
0 to 50% when b = 0, and 0 to 2.5% when b = 1.0. 
In both specifications, the probability of cross- 
pollination is 100% when d = 20 and X0 = 100%. 
Figure 1 displays the impact of pollen’s marginal 
transmission rate, b, on tipping dynamics within a 
hemp network. Different lines denote different b 
levels. Recall that b = 0 implies high pollination 
transmission between fields, and b = 1.0 implies 
lower transmission between fields. X0 denotes 
the percentage of all growers within the network 
who have adopted non- CBD crops at time 0. X1 
denotes the percentage of all growers within the 
network who have adopted non- CBD crops the 
following period. These curves are compared with 
a 45- degree line to illustrate if a trend either dies 
out or causes a tip to a new steady state over time. 
Going from left to right on the horizontal access, 
the first place the b curve intersects the 45- degree 
line is the tipping point. For a given curve, this per-
centage of initial adoption leads to the exact same 
amount of adopters the following period, X0 = X1. 
If X0 is greater than this, a tip occurs and X1 > X0 
which will continue until the curve intersects 
the 45- degree line a second time in which a new 
steady state is realized where once again X0 = X1 
For example, our baseline assumption of b = 0.50 
tips at X*0 = 22% and a moves to steady state of 
X = 75% after a tip occurs. Levels of X0 higher 
than 75 percent will decrease back to the steady 
state of X = 75%.
The key takeaway is that transmission rate mat-
ters a great deal for both whether the hemp market 
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tips to non- CBD production, and if it does tip, 
what percentage of it grows non- CBD. This means 
that supporting agronomic research to accurately 
estimate transmission rates is paramount. It also 
highlights some potentially strong policy prescrip-
tions. Finding a way to shift b from 0.50 to 0.75 
is enough to go from a tipping point of roughly 
X*0 = 22% and a steady state of X = 75% of hemp 
crops being non- CBD to one where a tip is impos-
sible. While policy makers cannot change the 
agronomics, they can affect b through the man-
date of barriers such as tree rows, or intertempo-
rally spacing when growers are allowed to plant 
various cultivars, which would keep reproductive 
maturity times staggered, therefore reducing trans-
mission rates. 
Degree of Neighbors
Degree captures the underlying structure of a 
given network. We assume a scale- free network 
where the probability density of having d neigh-
bors is d–2.5. This captures the empirical nature 
of this emerging hemp industry. A few regions of 
the United States have many individuals growing 
hemp in a small area. Many areas of the United 
States have a select number of individuals growing 
hemp in a large area. While this network structure 
that models central production hubs makes sense, 
we do not know what the maximum amount of 
neighbors, dmax, within a network is possible due 
to a lack of agronomic data quantifying pollen 
travel distance. A neighbor only counts as a neigh-
bor if their crop is close enough to cross- pollinate 
another grower’s crop. If pollination only can 
occur from adjacent fields, then a maximum of 
5 neighbors in a network is reasonable. If pollina-
tion can travel farther distances, then a degree of 
20 or more would be more appropriate to assume. 
Additionally, dmax is a moving target in both 
geography and time. Some regions in the United 
States grow more hemp than others. As additional 
farmers enter the hemp market, both dmax within 
a network and the expected degree for individual 
agents will increase over time.
Figure 2 captures the effect of network structure 
on tipping points and resulting steady states. Like 
Figure 1, X0 denotes the percentage of all growers 
within the network who have adopted non- CBD 
crops at time 0. X1 denotes the percentage of all 
growers within the network who have adopted 
non- CBD crops the following period. The curves 
denote different maximum values possible for 
degree of neighbors within a scale- free network. 
Figure 1. The impact of transmission rates on the tipping point and steady state of 

















beta=0.75 beta=1 45 degree line
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For example, dmax = 5 means a scale- free network 
with 1–5 neighbors possible and dmax = 10 means 
a scale- free network with 1–10 neighbors possible.
Unsurprisingly, increasing the amount of pos-
sible total neighbors within a network reduces the 
tipping point threshold and increases the result-
ing steady state after a tip. More surprising is its 
limited effect. Two potential explanations exist 
for this. The first is that under baseline assump-
tions of b = 0.5 transmission rates are fairly high 
for one additional farmer. For instance, if 50% of 
the population has already adopted the non- CBD 
crop, changing from a degree of 0 to 1 neighbor 
increases the probability of cross- pollination from 
0% to 22%. Going from 4 neighbors to 5 in this 
situation increases cross- pollination from 45% 
to 50%. This diminishing effect means that each 
neighbor added to an individual grower’s circle is 
less important than the one before. When trans-
mission rates are lower (b is higher), dmax has a 
larger effect. The second reason for this is due to 
the scale- free network assumption. Higher dmax 
values have a smaller effect on the actual expected 
value degree. Maximum values within scale- free 
networks are unlikely, so increasing that maxi-
mum value does not have a large impact on tipping 
dynamics. Policy- wise it seems more important 
to lower transmission rates than it does to limit 
the number of growers in a vacuum. Having 
more growers in a region, however, necessarily 
decreases the average distance between fields 
in that region, which would ultimately increase 
transmission rates.
Cost- Benefit Ranges
The quotient R is the distribution of grower’s 
benefit- cost ratio of adopting non- CBD within a 
network: ( ) ( , . )R pdf i N1BCii fe= = , where N is the 
total number of growers within a network. These 
benefits and costs contain objective values such 
as price and yield that can both vary across time 
and region. They also contain subjective values for 




implies a given grower views farming fiber rela-
tively favorably compared to farming CBD and will 
switch to fiber even when pollination is unlikely. 
A low value for R implies a given grower views 
farming fiber relatively unfavorably compared to 
farming CBD and will switch to fiber only when 
cross- pollination is very likely. The distribution R 
for growers within the network is uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and RMax. RMax is the maximum 
ratio possible of C
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network. Networks with a high RMax will, on aver-
age, view non- CBD farming more favorably than 
networks with lower RMax. In a network of risk- 
neutral farmers and favorable expected profits for 
CBD versus non- CBD, relatively low RMax values 
make sense. In a network of highly risk- adverse 
farmers and expected CBD profits only slightly 
higher than non- CBD, higher RMax values make 
sense.
Figure 3 shows the magnitude that expected 
benefit cost ratios have on tipping and steady 
state decisions. Curves denote uniform distribu-
tional assumptions that go from 0 to RMax. Higher 
values of RMax are indicative of higher expected 
benefit/cost ratios of switching to non- CBD pro-
duction. From Figure 3, we can observe that the 
more favorable growing non- CBD hemp is relative 
to CBD, the earlier tips occur and the higher the 
level of the resulting steady state. What is more 
surprising is how high RMax must be to induce a 
tip under our baseline assumptions of b = 0.50 and 
dmax = 20. Recall that Ri
B
Ci
i=  for grower i, where Bi 
denotes the benefit to growing non- CBD plus the 
avoided externality cost of not growing CBD—if 
the crop is cross- pollinated. However, CBD crops 
are not cross- pollinated with 100% certainty, 
which is why we include parameters g d 0a m=
b  to 
denote how likely cross- pollination is. A g below 
100% ultimately scales down Bi. This means that 
as long as cross- pollination is sufficiently unlikely 
or the damage to cross- pollination is low, a tip is 
unlikely to occur. This highlights the importance 
of developing CBD cultivars that are resistant to 
cross- pollination.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
When viewing our problem through the lens of 
diffusion on social networks, we notice one pri-
mary problem and four potential solutions. The 
problem is new farmers keep entering the hemp 
industry. This both increases d and strengthens the 
effect of g, which makes producing CBD hemp 
less attractive. The effect of g grows as the entry 
of additional hemp producers within a network 
Figure 3. Tipping point and steady state for varying levels of Bmax in the benefit- cost ratio of 
switching to fiber.
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decreases the distance between neighbors and 
increases the likelihood of at least one non- CBD 
neighbor’s crop reaching reproductive maturity at 
the same time as the CBD crop. This will eventually 
tip the industry from CBD hemp to fiber or seed 
hemp. Such an outcome is problematic, given that, 
at present, the estimated per acre revenue from 
CBD hemp production, absent cross- pollination, 
is many times the expected per acre revenue from 
fiber or seed production. 
Policy makers could address this by capping 
the amount of permits available for fiber and seed 
and auctioning them. This would increase the cost 
of growing non- CBD, Ci, limit how large mi could 
become, and limit the strength g (by increasing 
b) since fewer hemp producers would increase 
the average distance between each neighbor. This 
policy is attractive as it simultaneously targets the 
primitive with the largest effect on tipping (pol-
len transmission rates), while making it possible 
to constrain the percentage of non- CBD produc-
ers below the X*0 associated with a given level of 
bmax, Rmax, and b. 
Additionally, legislators could require fiber and 
seed producers to erect natural barriers such as a 
row of trees. This would simultaneously increase 
the cost of growing fiber, Ci, and reduce the strength 
of g. Windbreaks and other thick crops at the bor-
der of a field were estimated to reduce maize pol-
len dispersal between 30% and 60% (Ushiyama 
et al., 2009) and may also be efficient solutions 
in the context of hemp. Windbreaks would limit 
the strength of g by making cross- pollination less 
likely. The advantage to windbreaks is that they 
would degrade externality cost without additional 
regulation and would enhance biodiversity in the 
locales that implement them. The drawback to 
windbreaks is that they would likely be costly 
to implement both in terms of planting cost and 
reduced acreage available for growing crops. 
Agricultural zoning laws that geographically 
separate CBD and non- CBD production would 
reduce the proportion of CBD growers’ neighbors 
growing fiber mi, and the strength of g. The strength 
of g is reduced by increasing distance between CBD 
producers and their non- CBD producing neigh-
bors. Cross- pollination from a non- CBD producer 
is more likely if they are ¼ mile away than if they 
are 2 miles away. This could be problematic as it 
would not allow growers to self- select into what 
crop they would prefer to grow, since their land is 
in a fixed location. 
Temporal zoning laws that separate when CBD 
and fiber planting occur could reduce the prob-
ability of the negative externality occurring by 
staggering plant reproductive cycles. Temporal 
zoning laws reduce the strength of g which ulti-
mately diminishes the effect of increases in di or 
mi. Temporal zoning is an attractive possibility as 
it limits the probability of cross- pollination with-
out passing on any large cost to growers. Most 
growers currently grow hemp as a supplemen-
tal crop and not their sole crop. The thought is 
that farmers could redirect their time when they 
are not allowed to plant hemp to get their other 
crops established, freeing up time for when they 
can legally plant hemp. This would be less true if 
they were only growing hemp crops. These alter-
native policies can make the switch to non- CBD 
less attractive, subsequently pushing the hemp 
industry away from the tipping point and protect-
ing CBD producers.
The hemp industry is currently developing in a 
way that would encourage a tip to zero CBD (or 
near zero) production. General increases in the 
number of hemp farmers—and specifically increases 
in grain and fiber hemp farmers— contribute to 
increasing the negative network externality passed 
on to CBD growers. In the absence of policy to 
correct this, the industrial hemp market may tip to 
a new suboptimal Nash equilibrium where only/
mostly fiber and grain hemp are grown, thereby 
decreasing farm- level income. Of the policy pre-
scriptions considered, an auction for non- CBD 
production and intertemporal spacing appear to 
be the two with the most potential for prevent-
ing a tip to high non- CBD production. Auctioning 
rights to producing a good with a negative exter-
nality is a classic way of efficiently addressing the 
externality as it establishes property rights on the 
environmental amenity being degraded, in this 
case pollen levels in the air. Non- CBD producers 
would be forced to internalize the cost of their 
externality by paying for the right to emit pol-
len. This policy would increase distance between 
neighbors (decrease the strength of g by increas-
ing b), increase the cost of producing non- CBD C, 
and decrease mi by legally capping the number of 
growers who can produce non- CBD crops. Inter-
temporal spacing would likely be effective as well, 
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as it would reduce transmission rates. Recall that 
transmission rate by far had the strongest effect 
on tipping. Targeting this through intertemporal 
spacing of various hemp crops could dramatically 
reduce the social externality cost without pass-
ing any large cost onto growers. It may also be 
more politically feasible than some of the other 
options presented due to its low cost and relative 
light- handedness.
We offer three closing observations. First, the 
relevance of the work herein is without question. 
The proportion of hemp acres dedicated to CBD 
production was likely over 90% in 2019—and 
some argued higher still. For instance, Hemp 
Industry Daily estimates as much as 98% of acres 
in multiple regions to be planted for CBD (Drot-
leff, 2019). This proportion was anticipated to be, 
by some estimates, near 70% in 2020 (Sumner, 
2020). While the chief cause of this decline is not 
immediately clear, at least two implications are: 
the vast majority of acres are still devoted to CBD, 
but there is an increase in acres of non- CBD pro-
duction. This could be an indication of regional 
instances of tipping—the outcome suggested in 
this paper—or it simply could be a direct result of 
lower expected prices for CBD biomass after the 
glut experienced in 2019. In any case, the risk of 
cross- pollination has not decreased with this shift 
(it likely has grown). The second closing observa-
tion is that the ability to quantify policy impacts 
is currently limited because of present issues with 
data availability. Moreover, to do this is beyond 
the scope of the work herein, but is nonetheless 
a necessary undertaking and an inviting opportu-
nity for future research. Finally, network effects 
of cross- pollination are not simply an academic 
problem. Cross- pollination caused major law-
suits over intellectual property in the early 2000s 
when Monsanto’s Roundup- ready gene corn crops 
cross- pollinated neighboring fields that were grow-
ing corn from traditional seed. More recently, the 
marijuana industry has grappled with this same 
issue in the states that have legalized its produc-
tion (Borque, 2019). Specifically, cross- pollination 
from other hemp crops degrades THC levels in 
marijuana. Our empirical specification of Jackson 
and Yariv’s model could be applied to these types 
of agricultural applications as well. 
NOTE
The form of Equation (6) is associated with uniform 
distribution of R occurring from 0 to Rmax. For a more 
general form and detailed discussion of diffusion pro-
cess modeling see Jackson and Yariv (2006). 
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